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CAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND JUSTICE BE
RECONCILED THROUGH DISCOURSE
THEORY? REFLECTIONS ON
HABERMAS'S PROCEDURALIST
PARADIGM OF LAW
Michel Rosenfeld*
INTRODUCTION

There are different images or paradigms of law which corre
spond to different conceptions of justice and different sources of
legitimacy. Moreover, in the context of complex, pluralistic con
temporary societies, the relationship between law, justice, and le
gitimacy has become acutely problematic as competing conceptions
of the good cast legal relationships as relationships among stran
gers,^ and as justice according to law^ seems irretrievably split from
justice against or beyond law.^ In the face of these difficulties, one
could simply abandon the quest for justice beyond law and settle
for a combination of democracy and legal positivism which would
reduce political legitimacy to majority rule and confine the role of
law to the stabilization of expectations among legal subjects. How
ever, if fearful of tyrannical majorities and dissatisfied with the
prospect of predictable but unjust laws, one could opt for justice
beyond law and embrace human rights as a shield against the
abuses of legislative majorities and the inequities of positive law.
In short, in a contemporary pluralist society, law's legitimacy seems
to require sacrificing either democracy or justice."*
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
1 Cf. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 637 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1968) (greater differentiation characteristic of modern legal systems was prompted by
the advent of the market which brought strangers together to exchange goods and which
had to be regulated by universal laws transcending the biases of intracommunal norms).
2 "Justice according to law is achieved when each person is treated in conformity with
his or her legal entitlement." Michel Rosenfeld, Autopoiesis and Justice, 13 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1681, 1681 (1992) (footnote omitted).
3 "Justice against law, on the other hand, is the justice that makes it plausible to claim
that a law is unjust (even if it is scrupulously applied in strict compliance with the entitle
ments which the law establishes)." Id.
Recent debates in American constitutional law offer a salient example of the split
between democracy and justice. Some have advocated restrictive interpretations of consti
tutional rights, for fear of unduly trampling on the will of legislative majorities, while
others have not hesitated to promote enlarging the scope of antimajoritarian constitutional
rights in the name of "fundamental justice" and "basic fairness." Compare, e.g., the ma-
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Being relegated to either democracy or justice is bound to be
frustrating, in as much as majoritarian rule cannot be purged of all
arbitrariness and justice cannot shed all intracommunal roots to
rise above the reach of partial communities.^ There is, however, an
apparent way out of the vicious circle circumscribed by arbitrary
democracy and parochial justice. That way out is through
proceduralism, or, more precisely, through the kind of proceduralism that is capable of yielding what John Rawls calls "pure proce
dural justice."® It bears emphasizing that most kinds of
proceduralism will not do. After all, democratic lawmaking can be
viewed as a form of proceduralism based on universal suffrage and
majority rule. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that there could be
some kind of proceduralism capable of overcoming the residual ar
bitrariness of democratic lawmaking while, at the same time, main
taining a neutral stance toward the diverse and often conflicting
conceptions of the good found throughout the polity.
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm of law has all the makings
of a most attractive candidate for the purpose of establishing the
legitimacy of law through pure procedural justice. Indeed,
Habermas's proceduralist approach based on communicative ac
tion deals with the residual arbitrariness of democracy by relying
on dialogical consensus as the source of law's legitimacy. On the
other hand, Habermas's proceduralism provides fundamental
rights a legal grounding that seemingly obviates any need to justify
such rights in terms of any conception of the good not equally
shared by all the members of the polity. Moreover, not only does
Habermas's proceduralist approach to law offer a way to resolve
the conflict between democracy and justice, it also aims at estabjority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in cases such as Planned Parenthood of South
eastern Pa. V. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5 Justice beyond law cannot achieve complete impartiality toward all strangers in the
relevant class of legal subjects. Therefore, it must, at least in part, rely on a vision of the
good that has intracommunal roots, thereby favoring members of the relevant intracom
munal group over the remaining legal subjects. Thus, even the most basic and fundamental
human rights embodied in numerous international covenants have been criticized as being
somewhat parochial or culturally biased. See generally Bums H. Weston, Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION (Richard P. Claude &
Bums H. Weston eds., 1989) (focusing on westem liberal origins of modem human rights
conceptions); see also WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 4 (1995) ("Tradi
tional human right standards are simply unable to resolve some of the most important and
controversial questions relating to cultural minorities.").
6 According to Rawls, pure procedural justice is achieved when any outcome is justly
provided because a fair procedure was properly followed. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 86 (1971).
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lishing an internal connection between popular sovereignty and
human rights, thus providing a normative underpinning for a legal
regime that is poised to satisfy both democracy and justice.
In the last analysis, the value of proceduralism and the possi
bility of achieving pure procedural justice depend on the back
ground assumptions and the material conditions surrounding the
insertion and deployment of the relevant procedural devices and
practices. Consistent with this, I will argue that Habermas's
proceduralist paradigm of law ultimately fails to generate pure pro
cedural justice and that it falls short of furnishing a comprehensive
resolution of the conflict between democracy and justice.
Habermas appears to have taken proceduralism as far as it can go,
and through his discourse theory has made great progress over the
proceduralism that has emerged from the works of his major pred
ecessors, namely, Hobbes, Kant, and Rawls. But, as I shall en
deavor to indicate in what follows, even Habermas's more nuanced
and versatile proceduralism ultimately confronts the need to em
brace contestable substantive normative assumptions in order to
contribute to the resolution of conflicts that divide the members of
the polity.
In order to be in a better position to provide a principled as
sessment of Habermas's proceduralism, I shall first attempt to put
it in context. Accordingly, in Part I, I briefly examine some of the
most salient general features of proceduralism as a means to estab
lish its normative legitimacy. In Part II, I concentrate on the back
ground assumptions, material conditions, and tasks which give
shape to Habermas's proceduralism and I provide a critical assess
ment of certain problems it raises. In Part III, I take a close look at
a type of feminist objection which seems to go to the heart of
Habermas's discourse-theoretical justification of law. Finally, in
Part IV, I conclude that Habermas's discourse-theoretical ap
proach to law, while incapable of generating pure procedural jus
tice, nonetheless can play an important constructive role in
determining the normative legitimacy of contemporary law.
I.
Procedural justice—of which pure procedural justice is a limit
ing case—is a necessary component of any complex system for dis
pensing justice. Procedural justice, moreover, has an essentially
twofold role in a contemporary constitutional legal system: first, to
insure the just application of substantive norms belonging to the
realms of distributive, corrective, or retributive justice; and second.
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to protect the worth and dignity of persons whose legal entitlement
and obligations are subject to determination or modification by in
strumentalities of the state. While these two roles of procedural
justice are often intertwined in practice, they remain conceptually
distinct. Thus, for example, in the context of the United States's
adversarial criminal law system, the defendant's right to counsel
and right to cross-examine witnesses can be viewed in two ways.
These rights can be seen as both an important tool in the pursuit of
the truth—which is essential to the fair application of the substan
tive norms embodied in the relevant criminal statues—and as a
means of recognizing the defendant's inherent dignity by guaran
teeing his or her right of participation in a proceeding that may
result in a drastic change in his or her legal status. Conceptually,
however, procedural justice as a means of application is generally
parasitic on the substantive norms which it is designed to imple
ment. Accordingly, the adversary system's suitability as a vehicle
of procedural justice depends on whether it provides a reliable
means to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused. Providing
such a means is essential to the implementation of the relevant sub
stantive norms of justice embodied in the criminal code. In con
trast, procedural justice as a means to vindicate the dignity of the
accused is largely independent from, though it cannot squarely
frustrate the application of, the above mentioned relevant substan
tive norms. Consistent with this reasoning, even when the evi
dence against a criminal defendant is so overwhelming that guilt is
obvious beyond any reasonable doubt, the defendant is still enti
tled to have "his day in court."''
Accordingly, procedural justice simultaneously depends on
and transcends particular substantive norms of justice.® It does not
follow from that, however, that by virtue of transcending a particu
lar substantive norm, or a particular set of substantive norms, pro
cedural justice transcends all substantive norms. In fact, even
when procedural justice vindicates human dignity, it depends on
7 Furthermore, to the extent that its ability to ferret out the truth is what makes the
American adversary system of criminal justice procedurally just as a means of applying
relevant substantive norms of retributive justice, some of its key features as a guarantor of
human dignity—such as the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, which
allows the criminal defendant not to testify against him or herself—seem somewhat at odds
with its role as a procedural vehicle for the application of substantive justice.
8 Actually, the dependence between procedural justice and substantive norms of dis
tributive, corrective, or retributive justice is mutual rather than one sided. Indeed, if a
substantive norm is not capable of being applied in a procedurally just manner, it is alto
gether not suitable as a legitimate legal norm, although it may still qualify as a legitimate
moral norm.

1996]

RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE

795

substantive norais. However, the norms on which procedural jus
tice depends, in that instance, operate at a higher level of abstrac
tion than the particular substantive norms sought to be applied in a
just manner. Furthermore, because it is likely that there would be
a greater consensus regarding the substantive norms operating at
higher levels of abstraction (compared to the less abstract substan
tive norms sought to be applied in a just manner), the more ab
stract norms may appear to be universal or beyond conflicting
conceptions of the good. In other words, from the perspective of
the level of abstraction at which the conflict of particular substan
tive norms unfolds, the more abstract norms may be perceived as
remaining beyond dispute.
To illustrate this last point, let us consider the following exam
ple. Suppose that a state guarantees a certain minimum standard
of living to every citizen; everyone who can prove that he or she
cannot reach this standard through his or her own means is entitled
to receive public assistance. To implement this policy, the state
erects a welfare administration charged with the responsibilities of
processing applications for public assistance, determining whether
to award public assistance to particular applicants, and determining
whether to terminate such assistance upon a finding that a particu
lar recipient no longer needs it. Suppose, further, that the state's
constitution requires that each citizen be given an opportunity to
be heard before the revocation of any statutory entitlement.^ To
assess the administrative procedures designed to carry out the
state's public assistance program, reference must be made to the
following two norms: each citizen has a right to a state-guaranteed
minimum standard of living; and every citizen is entitled to be
treated with dignity and respect—which in this case requires that
he or she be afforded an opportunity to be heard before the termi
nation of public assistance payments. Although both of these
norms are substantive and contestable, the first, which is more con
crete, is much more likely to generate controversy than the second.
Thus, whereas libertarians, utilitarians, and egalitarians would un
doubtedly all endorse the second norm, they would most certainly
disagree concerning the legitimacy of the first norm, with the liber
tarians strongly objecting against welfare rights.^" Also, from
within the trenches of the conflict over welfare rights, the equal

9 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a hearing prior to the termination of welfare payments),
TO See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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dignity norm may be perceived as universally valid or at least set
tled beyond dispute.
The importance of procedural justice for modem legal systems
and the importance of its structure enabling it to fulfill the twofold
role identified above are no accident. Given modem law's strong
tendency to cast relationships among legal subjects as relationships
between strangers, it is hardly surprising that matters of procedure
should be brought to the forefront often predominating over mat
ters of substance." Perhaps less obvious, but equally important, is
the fact that this flight to procedure can never be completely suc
cessful, since matters of substance persist although they are often
either concealed or displaced. A particularly important example of
how substantive norms can be concealed by procedural ones
emerges through a closer look at pure procedural justice.
Rawls suggests gambling as an example of pure procedural
justice. In his own words, "If a number of persons engage in a
series of fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last bet is fair,
or at least not unfair, whatever this distribution is."^^ In other
words, any distribution resulting from a series of fair bets is just, so
long as the bets remain fair. If there is no tampering with the bet
ting procedure, such as there would be in the case of cheating, then
the outcome of the betting is purely procedurally just (or purely
procedurally not unjust). Moreover, since gambling is a means to
distribute or redistribute money or goods, gambling which consists
exclusively of a series of fair bets produces, in a purely procedural
manner, outcomes which further, or at least do not contradict, the
requirements of distributive justice.
If we look more closely at the proposition "any distribution
resulting from a series of fair bets is just," we can discern two dif
ferent plausible interpretations: one narrowly focused on gambling
as a procedure, the other more broadly focused on gambling as a
distributive device. Under the narrow interpretation, fair gam
bling, in contrast to unfair gambling, is just to the extent that all
participants in fair gambling obtain everything which they are enti-

An extreme example of the uses of procedural issues to mask conflicts between par
ties with widely divergent conceptions of the good is provided by the protracted discus
sions concerning the shape of the negotiating table at the onset of certain peace talks. See,
e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Third Round of Mideast Talks Closes with Scant Progress, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1992, at AL; Jackson Diehl & David Hoffman, Participants Gather for
Mideast Peace Talks, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1991, at A16.
12 RAWLS, supra note 6, at 86.
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tied to expect, namely an equal opportunity^^ (in the sense of an
equal probability) to become the winner. From the broader per
spective, however, fair gambling can only be just—or, much more
likely, not unjust—if certain material conditions and certain nor
mative assumptions are present. Thus, if fair gambling only in
volves individuals who risk small amounts of discretionary income,
in the context of a normative setting where random allocations of
discretionary income would not contravene prevailing norms of
distributive justice, then any outcome of fair gambling is not unjust.
If, on the other hand, fair gambling were to involve large sums of
money, including what for some gamblers would be considered
sums necessary for purposes of their subsistence, and if the gam
bling were to take place in a setting in which, according to prevail
ing substantive norms of distributive justice, redistributions of
income that cause any one to fall below the subsistence level are
deemed to be unjust, then even such fair gambling would clearly be
(distributively) unjust.
As the example of gambling indicates, pure procedural justice
depends on substantive norms of justice as much as the other forms
of procedural justice. Pure procedural justice differs only in that
under the confluence of certain material conditions and certain
substantive norms of justice, application of a given procedure is
bound to produce a just (not unjust) outcome or one of many
equally just (not unjust) outcomes. Moreover, the perception that
pure procedural justice remains independent from substantive
norms of justice is made possible by a twofold abstraction. First,
the legal subjects who avail themselves of the relevant procedure
are abstracted from (in the sense of being lifted out of) the
lifeworld of their daily existence. Second, the relevant procedure is
abstracted from the concrete material conditions and particular
substantive norms on which it depends for its ultimate justiflcation.
The second abstraction would be performed through lifting the rel
evant procedure from its broader legitimating factual and norma
tive context, and then focusing on this procedure so narrowly as to
leave its factual and normative setting out of the resulting picture.
The processes of abstraction present in both procedural and
purely procedural justice, while operating somewhat differently,
are ultimately relied upon to perform largely similar tasks. On the
one hand, abstraction is supposed to sufflciently detach legal sub
jects from the totality of their concrete trappings in order to place
13 See MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 42 (1991).
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the spotlight on similarities among such subjects, while downplay
ing the differences that set them apart. Accordingly, in the exam
ple of gambling, the individuals involved are considered in relation
to their placing bets and not in terms of their differing wealth, edu
cation, social class, or family status. Similarly, in the context of the
economic marketplace or of contract as a legitimate tool of proce
dural justice, individuals are considered in their capacities as pro
ducer, buyer, seller, or consumer rather than as men or women,
rich or poor, or members of an ethnic majority or minority.
In addition to lifting legal subjects out of their concrete socio
political circumstances, abstraction serves to minimize or to con
ceal reliance on contestable substantive norms when attempting to
settle conflicts among legal subjects. Moreover, these two different
tasks performed by abstraction are not independent from one an
other, but rather, are closely connected. As already mentioned,
the principal normative function of law in complex modem socie
ties is to provide for just intersubjective dealings among legal sub
jects who relate to each other as strangers. And, as between
strangers, justice would seem to require, above all, that all those
involved be treated as equals and that the customs, normative be
liefs, and ethical commitments of some not be favored over those
of others. Also, because one is most likely to perceive a stranger in
terms of the ways he or she differs from the members of one's own
group, justice among strangers seems to require conceptualizing
the realm of intersubjective transactions at a level of abstraction
that optimizes awareness of what strangers have in common.
Where legal subjects relate to each other as strangers, proce
dural justice becomes extremely important and promotes a brand
of equality that clusters around similarities. Genuine equality,
however, requires taking into account relevant differences as well
as relevant similarities.^'^ Accordingly, procedural justice seems
prone to overemphasize similarities, while underemphasizing dif
ferences. Because of this, from the standpoint of achieving global
justice, every move in the direction of the greater abstraction re
quired by procedural justice should be paired with a move in the
opposite direction in order to prevent the eradication of relevant
differences. This latter move, moreover, may either be set in mo
tion automatically, in the context of pure procedural justice operat
ing under propitious material conditions and normative
1'* Inequality results as much from treating those who are different as inferior as it does
from imposing treatment as equals onto those whose relevant differences have been disre
garded or suppressed. See id. at 222-24.
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assumptions, or it may be triggered by the application of substan
tive norms that counter the flight toward abstraction promoted by
procedural justice. In short, the task of justice is to account for and
reconcile relevant identities and relevant differences. Viewing law
as a medium, the above proposition means that the formal equality
derived from law, which conforms to procedural justice, must be
reconciled with the substantive equality that properly incorporates
differences. Furthermore, substantive equality can be promoted
through the content of legal norms.
Before turning to an examination of Habermas's proceduralist
paradigm, in light of the preceding observations, there are two fur
ther points about proceduralism in general which must be briefly
mentioned. First, it does not necessarily follow that although
proceduralism cannot do away with the need to embrace substan
tive norms, pure procedural justice is impossible. Clearly,
proceduralism cannot rise above substantive norms or appeal to
universally valid substantive norms. However, this does not pre
clude reliance on contestable substantive norms to the extent that
such norms must be implicitly or explicitly embraced by all those
confronted with the necessity of interacting with others, as legal
subjects having to relate to each other as equals and as strangers.
In other words, proceduralism may be acceptable in the context of
contestable substantive norms. This is true provided that the latter
norms cannot be legitimately contested by those who come under
the sweep of the background assumptions and material conditions
underlying the proceduralism under consideration.
Second, a distinction must be drawn between what may be
called "primary proceduralism" and what may be referred to as
"derivative proceduralism." Under primary proceduralism, de
ployment of the relevant procedure is both indispensable to and
determinative of any outcome that may be considered legitimate.
However, under derivative proceduralism, outcomes are ultimately
determined and legitimated by something more fundamental than,
or logically antecedent to, the relevant procedure. Consequently,
the relevant procedure is relegated to an auxiliary or essentially
rhetorical role. As an illustration, one can cite the difference be
tween "pure" or "primary" social contract theory and derivative
social contract theory:
Pure social contract theory posits that the ultimate justification
of all legitimate social and political institutions lies in the mutual
consent of the individuals affected by such institutions. .. . De
rivative ... social contract theories, on the other hand, recognize
the social contract device, but do not rely at the deepest level on
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mutual consent as the source of the legitimacy of social and
political institutions.^^
Consistent with this distinction, Hobbes is an exponent of pure so
cial contract theory, whereas Locke is an exponent of derivative
social contract theory.^® In Locke's theory, the ultimate source of
legitimacy is not the social contract itself, but rather the natural
right to property. This right to property both prompts the passage
from the state of nature to civil society and delimits the scope and
function of the social contract.^'
More generally, pure procedural justice requires primary
proceduralism and is ultimately inconsistent with derivative
proceduralism. Therefore, derivative proceduralism is not genuine
proceduralism but rather substantive theory in procedural garb.
II.
Habermas's proceduralism, rooted in his discourse theory,
emerges against the background of Hobbesian as well as Rawlsian
contractarianism. Hobbesian contractarianism satisfies the re
quirements of primary proceduralism yet remains morally arbi
trary; Rawlsian contractarianism incorporates the standpoint of
Kantian morality, but proves ultimately to belong to the realm of
derivative proceduralism.^® In Hobbesian contractarianism, the
contractual device both shapes and legitimates the contract of asso
ciation, which marks the passage from the state of nature to civil
society.^® The contractual device, moreover, performs a critical intersubjective task both by mediating between the conflicting wills
of individual contractors and yielding a common will, which differs
from every individual will involved, yet is nothing but the product
of a voluntary compromise among all the contractors.^"
15 Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law
and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 857 (1985).
15 See id.
17 See id. at 857-58.
18 See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS; CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 449-50 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
19 For a more detailed discussion of Hobbes's social contract theory, see Rosenfeld,
supra note 15, at 849-50, 852-55, 858-59.
20 In a paradigmatic contract between a buyer who wishes to obtain a coveted good as
cheaply as possible, and a seller who wishes to sell that good as expensively as possible, the
contract price will be set at a level that is higher than what the buyer wishes, but lower than
that wished for by the seller. Moreover, the contract price has to be such that neither the
buyer nor the seller prefers to walk away from the contract rather than entering into it.
Thus, the conflict between the will of the buyer and that of the seller is settled upon agree
ment on a contract price, which becomes the joint (intersubjective) will of buyer and seller
but which transcends each of their (initial) individual wills.
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Also, in the context of Hobbesian contractarianism, the state
of affairs resulting from implementation of the contract may com
port with the requirements of pure procedural justice, provided
certain material conditions and normative assumptions are satis
fied. Those conditions and assumptions are the ones that underlie
Adam Smith's conception of a market society in which the "invisi
ble hand" of competition transforms the clash of private interests
into a realization of the public interest.^^ In the context of the kind
of atomistic competition envisaged by Adam Smith, contract serves
to transform the products emanating from the arbitrary wills of in
dividuals into building blocks for the emergence of the public
interest.
Absent atomistic market competition, and upon rejection of
the Smithian conception of the relationship between the pursuit of
private self-interest and promotion of the public interest, contract
alone cannot serve to bridge the gap between private and public
interest. Accordingly, contract loses its ability to produce pure
procedural (distributive) justice. Furthermore, while still a me
dium for mediation of conflicting wills, contract no longer serves as
a means to transcend the arbitrary wills of individual contractors.
Finally, in the context of atomistic competition, each contractor
presumably has an equal opportunity to influence the shaping of
the common will through joint and mutual contract, whereas in the
absence of rough material equality among contractors, the superior
bargaining power of some contractors allows them to have signifi
cantly greater influence than others on the configuration of the intersubjective will produced through contract.^^ In short, cut loose
from its Smithian moorings, Hobbesian contractarianism in the end
is both morally arbitrary as well as partial toward some of the
contractors.
21 For a more extended discussion of the relationship between Adam Smith's concep
tion of a market society and the achievement of pure procedural justice through the imple
mentation of contracts,, see Rosenfeld, supra note 15, at 873-77.
22 Whereas it is obvious that the mere fact of contracting tends to lose its legitimating
role in the context of a legal contract between two contractors with widely different bar
gaining power, it is not immediately apparent that an analogous change takes place in the
context of the social contract. Upon reflection, however, the analogy seems to hold to the
extent that once the "invisible hand" premise is dropped, all the different conceptions of
the good are not likely to fare equally well when subjected to the social contract device.
Thus, for instance, communitarian and feminist conceptions of the good are much less
compatible with the ideology of contract than are individualistic and atomistic conceptions.
See, e.g., CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 2,108 (1988) (social contract estab
lishes a "fraternal patriarchy" through which men rule over women). Accordingly, if dif
ferences had to be settled through a contractual agreement, atomistic individualists would
have a built-in advantage over communitarians or feminists.
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Rawlsian contractarianism proposes to resolve both of the de
fects which plague its Hobbesian counterpart. To overcome moral
arbitrariness, Rawls infuses his social contractors with Kantian
moral universalism. Whereas Hobbesian contractors are motivated
to enter into the social contract to secure indispensable social co
operation on terms most favorable to the furtherance of their own
arbitrary will, Rawlsian contractors seek to establish principles of
justice upon which they could all equally agree.^^ Moreover, to
avoid the pitfalls caused by differences in power among contractors
and by partiality, Rawls places his hypothetical contractors behind
a "veil of ignorance." This is designed to make it possible for con
tractors to agree upon principles of justice without taking into ac
count either their social position or their conception of the good.^'^
The veil of ignorance secures equality by allowing strangers to
ascend to a higher level of abstraction. At this level they can dis
cover the core of their common identity, unhampered by the power
struggles and the clashing differences of their daily existence.
Based on that new-found equality predicated on their common
identity, strangers, through reciprocal recognition, can discover fair
principles of justice to govern all of their intersubjective dealings.
However, Rawls's use of the contract device at a higher level of
abstraction comes at too high a cost. Indeed, in the course of es
tablishing abstract equality behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls has
sacrificed difference, has reduced the social contract from a dialogical to a monological device, and has unwittingly paved the way for
the predominance of some perspectives which cannot be justified
as being superior to those against which they compete.^^
Rawls's abstract equality behind the veil of ignorance is objec
tionable to the extent that it drastically downplays difference in its
search for a solid common core of identity. Genuine equality re
quires taking into account relevant differences as well as relevant
similarities. Rawls's contractors have been deprived of the means
to perceive diversity, and are thus unable to factor relevant differ
ences into their elaboration of fair principles of justice. Differences
are also essential to the proper functioning of the institution of
contract, as only contractors with different needs, desires, motiva
tions, and resources are likely to seek out one another to negotiate
a contractual exchange. Ultimately, Rawls's contractors behind
23 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 11-12.
2'* See id. at 11.
. .
25 For an extended discussion of these shortcomings of Rawls's contractarianism, see
ROSENFELD, supra note 13, at 233-31.
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the veil of ignorance are reduced to the position of mere abstract
egos.^® And since abstract egos are interchangeable, as identically
constituted and uniform in perspective, individual conclusions
would not differ from those reached in concert concerning legiti
mate principles of justice. Under these circumstances, the contract
device seems altogether superfluous, rendering Rawls's principles
of justice monological rather than dialogical,^^ and his brand of
contractarianism derivatively proceduralist at best.
The most serious defect of the Rawlsian process of abstraction
is that it ultimately makes it possible, under the guise of remaining
neutral among different perspectives, for some perspectives to gain
the upper hand over others. This results from the very means of
abstraction that Rawls sets into motion in order to transform the
totality of everyday individuals embedded in their particular socio
political norms, institutions, customs, and practices into a collection
of pure abstract egos acting as social contractors behind a veil of
ignorance. Looking closely at this process of abstraction, a distinc
tion can be drawn between physical differences and differences in
perspective. For example, there is a difference between racial iden
tity as a function of skin pigmentation and racial identity as the
product of a distinct historical and cultural-based perspective.
Now, we can accept that the veil of ignorance conceals differences
based on skin pigmentation just as we can readily imagine a society
that is not comprised of differences in skin color. However, if his
torical events such as slavery and racial apartheid have created dis
tinct perspectives, which by and large correspond to differences in
skin color, then how can we go beyond these differences in per
spective while discarding differences in skin pigmentation? If there
is a universal perspective that transcends all particular perspec
tives, proceduralism would be entirely superfluous or merely triv
ial. Absent such a universal perspective, however, the abstract
egos behind the veil of ignorance would have to adopt either a ra
cial minority or a racial majority perspective in order to arrive at
any common principles sufficient to sustain fair principles of jus26 [Under] Rawls'[s] original position ... common principles emerge only after all
differences in life plans and in natural and social assets have been set aside.
Under these circumstances, common principles are reached, not from a diver
sity of perspectives that incorporates the multitude of existing differences, but
from the mere abstract identity that equalizes all individual perspectives after
having neutralized all the possible sources of individual differences.
Id. at 234-35.
27 This analysis is consistent with Habermas's assessment of Rawls's theory. See
JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 66 (Christian
Lenhardt & Shierry W. Nicholsen trans., 1990).
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tice. Under these circumstances, a racially influenced perspective
becomes a material condition that is bound to have an impact on
the selection of principles of justice, yet it remains concealed be
hind the erasure of differences relating to skin pigmentation.^®
Habermas's discourse-theoretical proceduralism provides the
means to overcome the particular limitations of both Hobbesian
and Rawlsian contractarianism. By relying on communicative ac
tion—action oriented toward reaching understanding^^—as a
means to generate consensus, Habermas provides a procedural ap
proach that makes for a clear demarcation between the generation
of intersubjective norms and their use to one's own advantage.
Consistent with this demarcation, and as a consequence of exclud
ing "strategic action"^" from the process designed to lead to the
consensual adoption of intersubjective norms, Habermas provides
a way to surmount the arbitrariness and lack of impartiality inher
ent in Hobbesian contractarianism. Indeed, contract is, above all,
the institution of choice to channel peaceful and orderly interaction
among strategically oriented social actors. Accordingly, the use of
contract to generate intersubjective norms seems destined to
subordinate the perspective of the rulemaker to that of the strate
gic actor who wishes to press his advantage as far as the rules per
mit. However, from the standpoint of communicative action,
where the focus is on reaching a consensus, both arbitrary will and
the strategic actors' thirst for success seem sufficiently isolated and
neutralized to move beyond the constraints inherent in Hobbesian
contractarianism.
Communicative action also provides the means to overcome
the two principal defects of Rawlsian contractarianism—namely its
inability to properly account for differences and its unintentional
privileging of certain perspectives over others. Not only is every
one supposed to participate in Habermas's discursive procedure
for generating and validating intersubjective norms, but there is no
28 For a more extended discussion of the role of race in shaping different perspectives
in the context of American society, as well as the relation between such perspectives and
norms of justice, see ROSENFELD, supra note 13, at ch. 9.
29 For a comprehensive discussion of communicative action, see 1 JORGEN HABERMAS,
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter 1
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION], and 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987).
30 According to Habermas, in strategic action, "the actors are interested solely in the
success, i.e., the consequences or outcomes of their actions, [and] they will try to reach their
objectives by influencing their opponent's definition of the situation, and thus his decisions
or motives, through external means by using weapons or goods, threats or enticements."
HABERMAS, supra note 27, at 133.
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veil of ignorance and everyone is free to introduce any matter of
concern for discussion. Accordingly, differences are not eliminated
ex ante, but are taken into full account; the ultimate decision as to
which differences to count as relevant to be reached by consensus
after full and uninhibited discussion. Moreover, Habermas's dialogical approach, unlike Rawls's contractarianism, is not reductive
when it comes to taking different perspectives into account. In
deed, not only does Habermas envisage taking all different per
spectives into account, but he insists that his discursive procedure
calls for the complete reversibility of the perspectives of all partici
pants in communicative action.^^ In other words, Habermas's
proceduralism requires, as a prerequisite to reaching a legitimate
consensus, that conflicts presented for discursive resolution be con
sidered by all participants from each and every perspective
involved.
Having thus set the procedural path free from unwarranted
Hobbesian and Rawlsian constraints, Habermas proposes his
proceduralist paradigm. According to this paradigm, the legiti
macy of law is to be gauged from the standpoint of a collectivity of
strangers who mutually recognize one another as equals and jointly
engage in communicative action to establish a legal order to which
they could all accord their unconstrained acquiescence. By means
of communicative action, a reconstructive process is established
through which the relevant group of strangers need only accept as
legitimate those laws which they would all agree both to enact as
autonomous legislators and to follow as law abiding subjects.
In accordance with this proceduralism, legal subjects can con
struct a perspective that enables them to view themselves simulta
neously as the authors and the addressees of law. From that
perspective, moreover, they may jointly determine which laws
would be acceptable to them in their capacities as both authors and
addressees. And, consistent with this proceduralism based on com
municative action, democracy and rights not only can be reconciled
but also apprehended as internally connected and mutually depen
dent.^^ Indeed, absent the safeguards built in through communica31 See id. at 122.
32 As Habermas states,
a legal order is legitimate to the extent that it equally secures the co-original
private and political autonomy of its citizens; at the same time, however, it owes
its legitimacy to the forms of communication in which civic autonomy alone can
express and prove itself. This is the key to a proceduralist understanding of
law.
JUrgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 777 (1996).
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tive action, democracy and rights remain at loggerheads since the
only guarantee against oppression by legislative majorities would
come from antimajoritarian rights limiting the scope of legitimate
democratic lawmaking. However, from the standpoint of commu
nicative action, the same rights, which those in the minority would
otherwise grasp as shields against the majority, would loom as part
of the same bundle of rights and freedoms which enables each
member of the legal community to become integrated with every
other member of that community.
In addition to reconciling rights and democracy from the
standpoint of communicative action, Habermas's proceduralist par
adigm of law also offers innovative means to pursue the purely pro
cedural achievement of justice. Indeed, as Habermas indicates, the
principal task of the strangers who relate to each other as equal
consociates under law is to reconcile the requirements of legal
equality with those of factual equality.^^ In other words, through
communicative action, legal actors are supposed to reach agree
ment among themselves as to which factual similarities and differ
ences ought to be taken into account by the law. As we have seen,
Hobbesian contractarianism shortchanges the demands of justice
to the extent that its proceduralism favors recognition of the identi
ties and differences dear to the most powerful. Likewise, Rawlsian
contractarianism also proves inadequate because, among other
things, its removal of certain differences ex ante renders it only de
rivatively procedural. Finally, substantive resolutions of the prob
lem of justice necessitate recourse to justice beyond law, which
compels favoring certain conceptions of the good over others. In
light of these alternatives, Habermas's procedural proposal seems
particularly attractive for at least two important reasons: first, it
allows all identities and differences to be considered while weeding
out strategic uses of them; and second, it requires subjecting all of
the identities and differences to every one of the perspectives rep
resented by participants in communicative action. Accordingly,
Habermas's proceduralism promises to reconcile legal and factual
equality in a way that not only accounts for all existing identities
and differences, but that also takes into consideration the impor
tance of every asserted identity and difference for each of the dif
ferent perspectives represented in communicative action.
The reconciliation of legal and factual equality is a paramount
task for postmetaphysical justice. As Habermas notes, however,
the two postmetaphysical legal paradigms—namely the liberal33 See id. at 778-79.
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bourgeois paradigm and the social-welfare paradigm (which he
seeks to replace with his proceduralist paradigm)—have not satis
factorily dealt with the nexus between legal and factual equality.^'*
The liberal-bourgeois paradigm reduces justice to the equal distri
bution of rights, thus basically ignoring factual equality.^^ The so
cial-welfare paradigm, on the other hand, seeks to remedy this
deficiency by zeroing in on the eradication of factual inequality,
and in so doing reduces justice to distributive justice.^^ As a conse
quence of this, in order to achieve factual equality, the dignity and
autonomy of those who must be clients of the welfare state become
substantially undermined.^"'
The material conditions underlying the emergence of
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm of law thus include both the
successive existences and failures of the liberal-bourgeois and so
cial-welfare paradigms. The liberal-bourgeois paradigm relies pri
marily on a formal conception of equality that clearly places
identity above differences.^® The social-welfare paradigm, in con
trast, fosters a material conception of equality that places differ
ences and the need to account for differences in the forefront,
leaving equality as identity in the background.
From the broader perspective of the struggle for equality,
originating in the repudiation of the feudal order, one can observe
an intertwining dialectic between identity and difference as well as
between equality and inequality. A brief look into this dialectic is
warranted at this point in order to place the struggle to reconcile
legal and factual equality, and the three paradigms of law discussed
thus far, in a broader context. This should make for a more thor
ough picture of the background and normative assumptions and of
the material conditions surrounding Habermas's proceduralist par
adigm of law.
In the struggle against feudal hierarchy, equality as identity
achieved predominance, as clearly evinced in the American Decla
ration of Independence's famous phrase, "All men are created
equal." Moreover, the emergence of equality as identity being a
rallying point for eighteenth century bourgeois revolutionaries is
34 See id. at 776-80.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 In other words, in the liberal-bourgeois paradigm, rights are distributed equally to
everyone since every individual is considered identical to every other individual as a being
who is inherently entitled to have rights. But if (material) differences among individuals
tend to be downplayed, inequalities in the capacity to exercise rights will be disregarded.
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set against the feudal order's association of difference with hierar
chical relations between superiors and inferiors. In other words, in
this particular setting, equality goes hand in hand with identity
whereas inequality is coupled with difference. Consistent with this
view, the pursuit of equality as identity is to promote the establish
ment of equal dignity of citizens regardless of status or birth.
There are, however, other contexts in which equality as iden
tity can be used as a weapon against treating all members of society
as equals.^® This occurs when equality has to be purchased at the
price of giving up cherished differences; for example, when equal
membership in a polity is conditioned on the adoption of an official
religion which may require repudiating or suppressing one's own
religious preferences. More generally, in terms of the dynamics be
tween identity, difference, equality, and inequality, whether equal
ity as identity ultimately contributes to, or frustrates, treating every
member of society as an equal depends on whether equality as
identity is pursued in a setting that is best characterized by the met
aphor of the master and the slave or by that of the colonizer and
the colonized. Indeed, the master treats the slave as inferior be
cause he is different, whereas the colonizer offers the colonized
equal treatment provided that the latter give up his own language,
culture, and religion and adopt those of the colonizer.''" Accord
ingly, in a master-slave setting, equality as identity is a weapon of
liberation whereas in a colonizer-colonized setting, it is a weapon
of domination."'
The dialectic between equality as identity and equality as dif
ference unfolds in the context of the struggle for equality against
the backdrop of commitment to prescriptive equality—that is, ac
cepting, as a normative proposition, that all persons are inherently
equal autonomous moral agents. Moreover, a discrepancy exists
39 Following Dworkin's distinction, equal treatment—that is, giving to each the same
thing—must be contrasted with treating persons as equals—that is, as possessors of the
same inherent worth and dignity. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227
(1977).
40 For a more extended discussion of these issues, see ROSENFELD, supra note 13, at
222-24.
41 A clear example of this contrast is furnished by the constitutional treatment of racial
differences in the United States. At the time when racial apartheid was constitutionally
sanctioned, the slogan "the constitution is colorblind" was a weapon used against the de
nial of equal dignity to African-Americans. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In the context of modem day claims to entitlement of af
firmative action, as a remedy against the lingering effects of past discrimination, however,
"the constitution is colorblind" has become the rallying point for those who refuse to re
dress continuing inequities against African-Americans. See, e.g., Paul C. Roberts, The Rise
of the New Inequality, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6,1995, at A20.
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between the ideal of prescriptive equality, which requires a recon
ciliation of legal and factual equality accounting for all relevant
identities and differences, and the conception of equality embraced
by active combatants in the struggle for equality. As long as the
full realization of the ideal of prescriptive equality remains elusive,
combatants struggling for equality seem bound to embrace posi
tions more tilted toward identity or difference, according to
whether they wage their fight against particular inequalities grafted
upon particular differences or, on the contrary, against inequalities
maintained through exploitation of certain identities. In as much
as the tilt required to combat inequality unduly sweeps ideally rele
vant identities or differences, the struggle for equality forces its
protagonists to temporally forgo the acknowledgment of certain
identities or differences that ultimately must figure in any legiti
mate reconciliation between legal and factual equality. Finally, the
dialectic between identity and difference assuredly compensates for
deviations that tilt too far toward identity or difference, without
ever reconciling the path of the struggle for equality with the one
carved by the ideal of prescriptive equality.
Regardless of whether questions of justice can ultimately be
determined independently from questions concerning conceptions
of the good, from the standpoint of those engaged in the struggle
for equality, how much equality there should be and for whom is
always embedded within the limited horizon of a concrete concep
tion of the good. To the extent that the struggle for equality is
likely to involve more than two protagonists, a protagonist's tilt
toward identity or difference in dealing with one antagonist may
come back to haunt that protagonist when confronting another an
tagonist. Thus, for example, from the perspective of the generation
that carried out the American Revolution and adopted the Consti
tution, their tilt toward identity, reflected in the phrase "all rnen
are created equal," was undoubtedly useful in the struggle against
Britain's monarchy. That same tilt, however, proves to be a nui
sance if not a downright obstacle in the context of establishing a
constitutional democracy that recognizes the institution of slavery
as lawful.^2 This example is admittedly extreme in that the per42 It is noteworthy that the United States Constitution of 1787 implicitly recognizes the
legal validity of slavery. See, e.g., U.S. CONST, art. I, §§ 2,9. Neither does the Constitution
contain equality rights, thus remaining at odds with the 1776 Declaration of Independence.
It would not be until after the Civil War that the Constitution would be amended to repu
diate slavery, and establish equality rights. U.S. CONST, amends. XII, XIV. For a thorough
and enlightening discussion of these issues, see David A.J. Richards, Revolution and Con
stitutionalism in America, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 577 (1993).
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spective embraced by America's founding generation leads to a
blatant contradiction, unless one is prepared to proceed as if slaves
were less than human.'*^ Even in more mundane cases, however,
there is likely to be a tension, if not a contradiction, between the
tilt one is forced to assume in one's struggle for equality and the
optimal amount of interplay between legal and factual equality
consistent with one's perspective grounded in one's own concep
tion of the good. In sum, considering that the struggle for equality
is waged from multiple perspectives and against many differently
positioned antagonists, the dialectic between equality and inequal
ity generates tilts, either in the direction of identity or difference,
which require correction. Overly sweeping claims are also gener
ated, which require adjustment to become better (without ever be
coming fully) reconciled with the comprehensive perspective from
which they are made. Thus, the interplay between identity and dif
ference must be treated as though it were a dynamic process affect
ing both the configuration and the scope of equality at any given
time and place.
Consistent with the preceding analysis, from the standpoint of
every perspective shaped by a particular conception of the good
(which is compatible at the highest levels of abstraction with pre
scriptive equality), the reconciliation between legal and factual
equality must satisfy two distinct and, at least to some degree, in
compatible requirements. First, such reconciliation should satisfy
the optimal relationship between identity and difference within the
conception of the good espoused by the relevant perspective. Sec
ondly, such reconciliation should level the playing field between
the existing tilts and excesses that result from the ongoing struggle
for equality among representatives of different perspectives. If the
desired balance is not achieved, the optimal mix between identity
and difference could not properly be set in motion in order to be
come effective. On the other hand, achievement of the desired bal
ance requires reliance on certain identities and differences that are
bound to upset, or at least postpone, the implementation of the
optimal mix.
The three paradigms of law discussed by Habermas can now
be put in context, both in terms of the dynamic struggle for equal
ity, and in terms of competing perspectives on equality and justice.
In terms of the struggle for equality, there is a dynamic progression
from the tilt toward identity of the liberal-bourgeois paradigm, to
Shamefully, this is what the United States Supreme Court did in its infamous Dred
Scott decision. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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the tilt toward difference of the social-welfare paradigm, and fi
nally to the attempt to incorporate, reconcile, and balance the vir
tues of liberal identity and social-welfare difference within the
proceduralist paradigm proposed by Habermas. Therefore, as
against the two paradigms which it seeks to replace, Habermas's
proceduralist paradigm appears to have significantly levelled the
field on which the battle for the optimal reconciliation of legal and
factual equality must be fought. This, however, does not necessar
ily imply that Habermas's paradigm levels the field sufficiently as
between the competing perspectives it encompasses, or that it can
yield any reconciliation of legal and factual equality that would be
acceptable to all the encompassed perspectives.
Focusing on the issue of the perspectives encompassed within
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm, three important questions
arise. First, does Habermas's proceduralist paradigm, by the very
nature of communicative action, effectively exclude certain per
spectives? Second, does the proceduralist paradigm provide a
workable means of achieving a genuine consensus among the com
peting perspectives it encompasses regarding the optimal mix of
identities and differences, in relation to the legitimate reconcilia
tion of legal and factual equality? And, third, does the procedural
ist paradigm provide an adequate means of leveling the field on
which the perspectives it encompasses compete for justice and
equality? Phrased somewhat differently, these three questions can
be restated as: (1) which perspectives can expect justice under
Habermas's proceduralism?; (2) can such proceduralism produce
justice among different perspectives?; and (3) can such procedural
ism yield equal justice as gauged from within each of the encom
passed perspectives?
Consistent with Habermas, in answering the first question it is
clear that some perspectives are effectively excluded from the dis
cursive resolution of questions concerning justice. Thus, all per
spectives that could be broadly characterized as metaphysical
perspectives—including those framed by religious dogma and ide
ology—would effectively be excluded or, more precisely, would ef
fectively exclude themselves from any dialogical process designed
to resolve issues of justice. To be sure, this is not problematic for
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm since he makes it clear that his
paradigm is designed for postmetaphysical conflicts over justice.
The exclusion of metaphysical perspectives is noteworthy. It un
derscores that communicative action is not neutral as between all
conceptions of the good, even if in the final analysis it remained
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neutral among the different conceptions of the good that are not
incompatible with it.
Communicative action effectively excludes not only metaphys
ical perspectives but also nonmetaphysical ones that reject adher
ence to prescriptive equality. Indeed, there seems to be little point,
from the standpoint of nonmetaphysical perspective adherents
(who maintain that some are inherently superior), to submit their
views concerning justice for discussion with those whom they do
not consider as equals. Even if convincing the unworthy is not
deemed futile, communicative action by its very structure would
still remain manifestly unfavorable toward blatantly inegalitarian
ideologies that altogether reject prescriptive equality. In short, it
remains to be seen whether Habermas's proceduralism is neutral as
between the perspectives it encompasses. However, the exclusion
consistent with Habermas's proceduralism of metaphysical and
nonmetaphysical hierarchical perspectives indicates that it is ulti
mately tied to certain substantive normative assumptions, albeit
negative ones.
The answer to the second question—namely, whether commu
nicative action can carve out a common ground for justice encom
passing all of its perspectives—depends on the nature of the
procedural devices involved in communicative action as well as on
the existence of material conditions making it plausible for the re
versal of perspectives (undertaken by actors engaged in communi
cative action) to generate fruitful consensuses or compromises. As
conceived by Habermas, communicative action requires each par
ticipant to have an equal opportunity to present claims for consid
eration and a universal commitment to be swayed only by the force
of the better argument."*^ Thus, the only legitimate normative regu
lations under Habermas's proceduralist paradigm would be those
which have been assented to by all the participants in rational dis
courses who might be affected."*^ Moreover, in the context of legal
as opposed to moral norms, Habermas stipulates that assent could
be based on bargaining and compromise as well as on consensus."*®
Finally—and an important advance over Rawlsian contractarianism—the needs, wants, and interests of participants in communica
tive action are not taken by Habermas to be immutable; rather
they are subject to evolution and transformation pursuant to diaFor a comprehensive discussion of communicative action, see 1 HABERMAS, THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 29, at 273-337.
•*5 See HABERMAS, supra note 18, at 459-60.
•^6 See id. at 460.
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logical exchanges. Because communicative action, as conceived by
Habermas, can contribute to the formation of opinions and wills,
it is not simply relegated to finding overlapping interests; it is also
equipped to harmonize interests through dialogical transformation.
In view of the characteristics of Habermas's proceduralism,
there are at least three significant impediments to the goal of
achieving an accord on justice among representatives of the diverse
perspectives engaged in communicative action. First, the reconcili
ation of perspectives might ultimately prove to be a purely contin
gent matter. In that case, Habermas's proceduralism would prove
inadequate because under many plausible circumstances it would
fail to lead to any legitimate reconciliation of legal and factual
equality.
One way to avoid this latter possibility is by emphasizing the
requirement of rationality. Indeed, if rationality is called for by
communicative action in the selection of ends, in dealing with the
means toward one's ends, and in dealing with conflicts that exist
among persons who pursue different ends, then attaining an accord
on justice may no longer be contingent. But that leads to the sec
ond problem. If the requirement of rationality is strong enough to
foreclose the contingency of an accord, then that accord is depen
dent on the operative norm of rationality rather than on dialogical
reciprocity. Consequently, Habermas's proceduralism would be
come essentially derivative.
Relying upon bargaining and compromise, as well as on con
sensus coupled with emphasis on the transformability of needs,
provides an alternative way to minimize the chance that the
proceduralist paradigm will fail to yield an accord. This last alter
native, however, leads to the third problem. If the pressure to
reach an accord is intense, then bargaining and compromising—
even if they remain free of strategic action—may favor certain per
spectives over others (as contrasted with certain individuals over
others). If that were the case, Habermas's proceduralism would
fail to remain neutral as between the perspectives which it encom
passes (much like Hobbesian contractarianism proved unable to
remain neutral as between all contractors).
The preceding observations fail to identify any definitive an
swer to the second question. However, they raise significant
doubts whether Habermas's proceduralism alone, unsupported by

47 See id. at 461-62.

814

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:791

substantive norms, can reliably lead to an accord on justice among
different perspectives without favoring some of those perspectives.
The last of the three questions—namely, can the proceduralist
paradigm level the field on which competing perspectives vie for
justice—as with the second, cannot presently be given anything
nearing a definitive answer. To the extent that proceduralism's
search for an accord on justice leads to the favoring of some per
spectives, the third question would seem to require a negative an
swer. However, assuming an accord could be reached without
having to favor any of the relevant perspectives, the success of
Habermas's proceduralism to level the playing field would appear
to depend on whether the requisite leveling could be achieved
through dialogue, or whether it calls for predialogical or extradialogical adjustments. To further clarify these matters, I now turn to
an important feminist objection to Habermas's proceduralism.
III.
The feminist challenge to Habermas's proceduralism is partic
ularly serious since it is launched from a perspective that is neither
metaphysical nor hierarchical in nature. Moreover, the feminist
challenge attacks Habermas's proceduralism on at least two differ
ent levels. On one level feminists can argue, even assuming com
municative action remains neutral between feminist and maleoriented perspectives,''® the respective needs, wants, and interests
of each are given such disparate interpretations that it is not realis
tic to expect any general agreement on how to reconcile legal and
factual equality. On another level, feminists can argue that discur
sive proceduralism cannot level the playing field which has tradi
tionally heavily tilted toward male-oriented perspectives.
Additionally, feminists could press the more radical claim that by
its very structure communicative action favors male-oriented per
spectives over feminist ones. Consequently, no purely dialogical
determination of the relation between legal and factual equality
could ever prove genuinely acceptable to feminists.
Habermas agrees with the feminists that both the liberal-bour
geois and the social-welfare paradigms evince biases against wo^*8 It is important to remember that what distinguishes feminist perspectives from maleoriented ones are primarily gender-related differences. These differences are largely sociocultural constructs rather than differences merely based on sex. Furthermore, while femi
nist perspectives may more likely be embraced by women than by men, certain men are
genuinely feminists just as certain women side with antifeminists.
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men.'*^ However, he disagrees with the feminists when it comes to
the proceduralist paradigm. Essentially, Habermas's response to
the feminist challenge is that since gender differences are con
structed and not pre-established, conflicts between feminist and
male-oriented views should be amenable to dialogical resolution
just as other interperspectival conflicts.^"
To determine whether Habermas's proceduralism can success
fully overcome the feminist challenge, it is first necessary to take a
closer look at some of that challenge's principal characteristics.
Moreover, since there is by no means unanimity among feminists, I
shall take a reconstructive approach and combine various elements
that have figured in feminist critiques, while advancing the most
effective good faith feminist challenge possible. Also, as genderrelated issues may vary among cultures, I will only refer to genderrelated issues as they arise in the United States.
The feminist challenge in the United States is premised upon a
constitutional, legal, cultural, and social tradition that has repeat
edly used and/or constructed differences between men and women
to the detriment of the latter, in order to perpetuate a male domi
nated society. In that society, with its male-oriented institutions,
the best women can hope for is that gender differences will not be
used against them. In other words, women's only realistic escape
from being subordinated has required them to settle as being colo
nized^^ in a male run colony. From the standpoint of the relation
ship between legal and factual equality, women have generally
experienced two different regimes during the course of American
history. Initially, the relationship between legal and factual equal
ity unfolded in a setting tilted toward difference, with differences
being, for the most part, weighted against women.^^ More recently,
the tilt has shifted toward identity, but women still have been sig
nificantly disadvantaged, in as much as identity has essentially
meant conformity with male identity.®^
It is against this background of exploited differences and co
erced identities that feminists may construct a comprehensive perSee Habermas, supra note 32, at 781-82.
50 See id. at 783-84; see also supra pp. 796-98.
51 See the distinction between master/slave and colonizer/colonized relationships, supra
notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (state refusal to allow
women to practice law held constitutional on grounds that a woman's proper role was that
of a wife and mother).
53 See Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (arguing that
Supreme Court adjudication on sexual discrimination and pregnancy has posited men's
experience as the "norm" against which women are measured).
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spective, with a vision of the good based upon a recasting of
identities and differences in ways that are likely to be liberating
and enriching for women. Inspired by Carol Gilligan's vision, fem
inists might construct a conception of the good stressing intimacy,
attachment, interdependence, care, concern, responsibility, and
self-sacrifice.^'' Such a feminist conception of the good would
sharply contrast with its typical male-oriented counterpart, empha
sizing separation, competition, and achievement.^^
Now, let us suppose that representatives of the abovesketched feminist perspective (to whom I shall refer as "the femi
nists") confront representatives of the typical male-oriented per
spective (to whom I shall refer as "the masculinists"), and that they
jointly endeavor to reach a dialogical consensus on a mutually ac
ceptable reconciliation of legal and factual equality. Let us sup
pose, further, that from the outset the feminists stipulate that they
concede that the proceduralist paradigm is neutral as between masculinist and feminist perspectives. Under these circumstances, the
feminists will start the confrontation by recounting the history of
sex discrimination and will argue for the adoption of legal norms
that would enhance care, responsibility, and meeting the needs of
concrete others.^^ The masculinists, on the other hand, while ac
knowledging past inequities, will propose legal norms emphasizing
autonomy and fair competition which would preclude genderbased discrimination.
Assuming that no legal norm capable of equally satisfying the
masculinists and the feminists were to emerge at that point, our
protagonists could proceed to engage in a reversal of perspectives.
This would allow them not only to achieve greater empathy toward
their antagonists' plight, but also to become aware of the relative
importance of each particular claim from within the comprehensive
perspective it originated. Awareness of the relative importance of
See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WO
MEN'S DEVELOPMENT 12, 73-74, 132 (1982). Gilligan is concerned with morals, not law.
Her views, however, have influenced feminist legal theorists. See e.g., Ellen C. DuBois et
al.. Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11
(1985). For a critique of Gilligan by a feminist legal theorist, see Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Juris
prudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135, 1141 n.l2 (1990).
55 Habermas has rejected the validity of Gilligan's challenge relating to issues in the
theory of moral development. See HABERMAS, supra note 27, at 175-84. That controversy,
however, has no direct bearing on the use of Gilligan's work to outline the contours of a
plausible feminist conception of the good.
55 Cf. GILLIGAN, supra note 54, at 11 (contrasting men's tendency to focus on "the
generalized other" with women's draw toward the "particular other").
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conflicting claims within their respective perspectives might prove
quite helpful—it would be rational to sacrifice a claim of lesser im
portance within one's own perspective to accommodate a claim
that within another perspective is much more important. Such a
sacrifice would be rational (in the sense of rationality of means
rather than rationality of ends) considering the potential for recip
rocal gestures that would ultimately inure to the benefit of all those
involved.
Now, let us assume that after ranking all wants and interests
and abandoning the pursuit of those which rank lower in the hier
archy, in order to facilitate the realization of those which rank
higher, the masculinists and the feminists still have not been able to
settle on equally acceptable legal norms. At that point, it is possi
ble that each would try to convince the other to change their needs
and wants. Thus the feminists would argue that competition is not
everything and greater connectedness could enrich the lives of the
masculinists. The masculinists would try to impress upon the femi
nists that competition is not as bad as they think, particularly if it is
scrupulously rid of all vestiges of gender discrimination.
At that point in the dialogue, it is possible that a consensus
regarding legal norms might be reached. But it is equally possible
that a consensus on equally acceptable legal norms might never be
reached. The inability of reaching a consensus would not occur be
cause of any strategic behavior, but simply because the honestly
held divergent conceptions of the good, even after accounting for
all the concessions and adjustments mentioned above, would re
main too far apart.
Thus far I have assumed that the feminists do not challenge
the proposition that the proceduralist paradigm is neutral as be
tween the feminist and the masculinist perspectives. There are,
however, several plausible reasons which would lend support to
such a challenge. Furthermore, the feminists could bring either a
moderate or a radical challenge against the proposition regarding
proceduralist neutrality.
For the moderate challenge, feminists would argue that the
procedural guarantees afforded by dialogical proceduralism are in
sufficient to level the playing field since public discourse has histor
ically been heavily tilted toward masculinist perspectives, as have
the liberal-bourgeois paradigms and the social-welfare paradigms
and most existing legal norms. Given that masculinist views are so
entrenched in the ideology and the institutional structures of the
polity, to have an equal opportunity to present one's claims and to
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attempt to transform existing needs, wants, and interests, seems
fairly unlikely to balance the conflicting positions. This is true not
because of any strategic conduct by the masculinists, but rather be
cause they are so deeply set in their ways.
Even assuming its validity, the moderate challenge may not be
fatal to proceduralism, since even deeply entrenched positions
could change over time. However, time is not a trivial matter when
it comes to legitimating legal norms. If meaningful changes in
opinion- and will-formation can be expected to take several gener
ations, then exclusive reliance on dialogical proceduralism would
seem undesirable and inadequate.
Much more threatening to discursive proceduralism is the rad
ical feminist challenge. That challenge takes as its first point of
argument Gilligan's view that men's ethics are oriented toward
rights, equality, and fairness, while women's are oriented toward
responsibilities, equity, and the recognition of differences in need
among concrete others.^' Suppose the masculinists and the femi
nists incorporate, as part of their conceptions of the good, the
views that Gilligan ascribes respectively to men and to women.
Feminists could then launch the following attack. By its very struc
ture—which is designed to lead to justice, equality, and rights—the
proceduralist paradigm is inherently biased in favor of masculinist
perspectives, against feminist perspectives. Ironically, because it
provides for a reversal of perspectives, the proceduralist paradigm
does not exclude expression of the needs, interests, or desires of
feminists and even allows for masculinist empathy toward feminist
claims. But those virtues are eventually nullified, in that, by its
very nature, the proceduralist paradigm channels all intersubjective
conflicts toward resolutions that must comport with justice, equal
ity, and rights. Although the proceduralist paradigm gives the im
pression of treating feminists as full partners in the dialogical
process, the very structure of that process forces feminists to sup
press their most fundamental differences in order to obtain a mea
sure of recognition that does not seriously threaten the hegemony
of masculinist perspectives. In short, the proceduralist paradigm
makes it possible for an individual feminist claim to be given prior
ity over a competing masculinist claim, but it forecloses something
much more fundamental from a feminist perspective—the replace
ment of "the hierarchy of rights with a web of relationships.
57 See id. at 164.
58 Id. at 57.
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In defense of the legitimacy of the proceduralist paradigm, it
could be argued that if the radical feminist challenge proves any
thing, it proves too much. Because its targets include justice,
equality, and rights as such, rather than any particular conception
of them, the radical feminist challenge implies that law itself cannot
possibly be justified as a medium for legitimate intersubjective in
teraction. Therefore, the radical feminist challenge would ulti
mately lead to a social universe devoid of law, in which feminists
would either forcibly convert those who would oppose the imple
mentation of their conception of the good, or their antagonists
would go their own separate way.
Feminists, however, could argue that their radical challenge
does not necessarily have the dire implications mentioned above.
Viewed more closely, the radical feminist challenge is not against
law itself, but against a paradigm of law which is buttressed by a
particular conception of law and rights. Following this line of rea
soning, a brief focus on Habermas's conception of rights reveals
that while he is open as to the content of legal rights, he clearly
embraces a "static" rather than a "dynamic" conception of law as a
medium of intersubjective interaction.^® In Habermas's view, legal
rights (as opposed to moral rights) are above all entitlements,
which are logically prior to the duties they trigger.^" Therefore,
such rights carve out boundaries which tend to separate the
rightholder from those who must assume a duty as a consequence
of his or her entitlement. In the context of a dynamic jurispru
dence such as the common law, however, because of the presence
of greater flexibility, open-endedness, and indeterminacy, rights
and duties become the product of interaction among legal actors;
thus, they are always susceptible to further perfection through
cooperation.®^
59 See Arthur J. Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules: Writing Law According to Moses, With
Reference to Other Jurisprudences, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1079,1125 (1990); see also Arthur
J. Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. REV, 877, 889-90 (1989) [hereinafter
Jacobson, Hegel]. For present purposes, the key distinction between these two jurispru
dences is that dynamic jurisprudences are open-ended and primarily concerned with the
realization and development of legal personality. Static jurisprudences are primarily con
cerned with instituting legal order and, accordingly, draw sharp lines between legal rela
tionships and other intersubjective relationships which remain essentially beyond the reach
of law.
50 In Habermas's own words, "[wjhereas in morality an inherent symmetry exists be
tween rights and duties, legal duties only result as consequences of the protection of entitle
ments, which are conceptually prior." HABERMAS, supra note 18, at 451.
51 Cf. Jacobson, Hegel, supra note 59, at 890-91 (in the common law system persons
cannot interact without generating rights and duties, yet cannot know what those rights
and duties are until after they have interacted).
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With the distinction between static and dynamic jurispru
dences in mind, the feminists can argue that their radical challenge
does not demand the abolition of law, justice, equality, and
rights—it calls only for the replacement of the proceduralist para
digm and its static conception of rights with an alternative para
digm creating a dynamic conception of rights. This alternative
paradigm would alter the importance of justice, equality, and
rights, by balancing them against normative standards designed to
enhance promotion of the "web of relationships." Moreover, any
alternative paradigm of law designed to be consistent with the radi
cal feminist challenge, could neither be exclusively dialogical nor
merely procedural. It would have to press substantive feminist
norms against masculinist objections, thus having to rely on predialogical or extradialogical sources of legitimacy.
Proponents of legal proceduralism may object to any alterna
tive feminist paradigm which would countenance the imposition of
feminist norms over masculinist objections arguing the paradigm
would be arbitrary or inconsistent with a commitment to prescrip
tive equality. Feminists however could counter, arguing that their
proposed alternative paradigm would neither be arbitrary nor in
violation of the dictates of prescriptive equality. Focusing on the
dialectics between identity and difference, and between equality
and inequality, feminists could claim that progress toward an opti
mal reconciliation of legal and factual equality has always been
achieved through a series of thrusts that overshoot their intended
target, thereby tilting legal paradigms toward certain conceptions
of the good to the detriment of other conceptions. This state of
affairs requires compensation which necessitates generating a tilt
toward the opposite direction. Therefore, the feminist alternative
paradigm, with all its bias, is a logical moment in the ongoing strug
gle to reach an optimal reconciliation of legal and factual equality.
Consequently, such an alternative feminist paradigm is neither ar
bitrary nor contrary to prescriptive equality.
Based on the above examination of the feminist objection to
Habermas's proceduralist paradigm of law, it is now possible to
give a more complete answer to the two questions left open at the
end of the Part II. First, unaided by additional substantive norms,
legal proceduralism cannot be expected to produce justice among
different perspectives within its domain. Second, proceduralism
alone fails to yield equal justice as gauged from within each of the
encompassed perspectives.
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IV.
Considering that pluralism implies a lack of agreement regard
ing substantive norms, it would seem to be the most promising ally
of pure procedural justice. Ideally, proceduralism should save plu
ralism from the embarrassment of having to choose among the var
ious competing conceptions of the good it encompasses. However,
pluralism and pure procedural justice are ultimately incompatible.
Conversely, whereas a community that shares the same substantive
norms may seem to have no use for mere procedural justice, pure
procedural justice can assume a legitimate role in the context of
shared substantive norms, as indicated by the gambling example
discussed earlier.®^ If these observations are correct, then
Habermas's legal proceduralism may be vindicated to the extent
that it is confined to contexts regulated by shared substantive
norms. Moreover, while such vindication may fall quite short of
pluralist expectations, it is by no means trivial.
Before looking into the relationship between pluralism and
pure procedural justice, a distinction concerning pluralism must be
briefly addressed. Pluralism may either be methodological or com
prehensive. Methodological pluralism can be characterized as a
tool designed to prevent any substantive conception of the good
from achieving a dominant position in the public sphere. Compre
hensive pluralism, on the other hand, is a full-fledged substantive
perspective encompassing a particular conception of the good
which requires the inclusion and protection of different substantive
perspectives that can be accommodated peacefully within the pol
ity. The distinction between these two kinds of pluralism raises the
following question: Since comprehensive pluralism relies on
shared substantive norms, is it not then compatible with pure pro
cedural justice? As we shall see, the answer to this question is
eventually negative, even though comprehensive pluralism reserves
an important but limited role for proceduralism.
To get a better understanding of the relationship between plu
ralism and proceduralism, it is useful to refer back to the image of
transcommunal market relationships among strangers.^^ At first,
one can assume that the market where strangers came to exchange
goods was an important yet occasional focus for intersubjective
dealings. Under these circumstances, the market required transcommunal laws to regulate dealings among strangers and to stabiSee supra pp. 796-98.
See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text. For a more extended discussion, see
Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 1689-94.
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lize the latter's expectations. Aside from the occasional forays into
the market, intersubjective dealings also took place intracommunally, where they were regulated primarily by common religious
and ethical norms or by laws conforming to such norms. Given
that everyone returned to his or her own community except for
limited market exchanges, it makes sense that the legal norms reg
ulating market transactions would be procedural in nature.
Although one cannot properly speak of pluralism in this scenario,
it would be fair to speak of a proceduralism bound by a plurality of
distinct communities.
At the next stage, one can imagine that the market has be
come more important, and that all the bordering communities
sending people to the market will associate into a loose confedera
tion. In this situation, pluralism and proceduralism co-exist, but
their respective spheres of operation remain completely separated
from one another.
As the market encroaches ever more on communal life, how
ever, proceduralism and pluralism enter a collision course. On the
one hand, the market increasingly expands onto the terrain for
merly reserved for communal ethical and religious life, forcing sub
stantive communal norms to spill over into the sphere of market
interactions for lack of another suitable outlet. On the other hand,
since markets are not perfect, the more pervasive market relations
become, the greater the need to bring in substantive norms in or
der to channel market transactions toward the common good.
To the extent that market self-regulation is no longer satisfac
tory, proceduralism must give way or become subordinated to sub
stantive norms. Methodological pluralism may be used in an effort
to prevent proponents of certain conceptions of the good from sub
jugating proponents of other conceptions, but it is merely a limited
tool with restricted potential. Comprehensive pluralism, on the
other hand, provides a full-fledged perspective and therefore de
serves a closer look.
The ideal underlying comprehensive pluralism is to create a
society in which all conceptions of the good are equally encom
passed, but in which none is dominant (or superior). However, this
ideal cannot possibly be realized. It is obvious that the entire pliiralist project will collapse unless comprehensive pluralism itself is
given priority over the remaining conceptions of the good. There
fore, to survive, the project of comprehensive pluralism must split
and proceed at two distinct levels. Furthermore, this split must
take place in two logically, though not necessarily temporally, dif-
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ferent moments. In the first moment, comprehensive pluralism
must be detached from other perspectives in order to ascend to the
requisite position of primacy. Yet to survive, pluralism cannot re
main detached because it is ultimately parasitic on other perspec
tives. Indeed, if all other conceptions of the good were to
disappear, pluralism would become meaningless. Accordingly, a
second moment must follow.
In the second moment, pluralism must be reconnected with
the perspectives from which it had been detached. However, the
reconnection must allow pluralism to retain its primacy while al
lowing the other perspectives to remain equal among themselves.
To be viable, pluralist norms must occupy the place of a second
order of norms, while the norms which emanate from other sub
stantive conceptions of the good would operate as first order
norms.
If the equal subordination of all first order norms to the sec
ond order norms of pluralism were possible, then comprehensive
pluralism could in principle go hand-in-hand with proceduralism.
However, this is not possible since equal subordination requires
detachment as well as reintegration. Indeed, detachment of plural
ism as a second order norm is realized through a process of nega
tion that is embraced by all comprehensive pluralists and deals
equally with all first order norms. Hence, in its negative work,
comprehensive pluralism could rely on purely procedural devices.
However, with respect to the positive task of reintegrating
subordinated first order norms, neither equality nor unanimity can
be achieved by comprehensive pluralism. Because, when it comes
to reintegrating into a comprehensive pluralist framework, some
first order norms—such as those of crusading religions—will prove
altogether incompatible with pluralism and therefore have to be
suppressed. Other first order norms—such as those of noncrusading religions—will have to be displaced but they will not have to be
suppressed. For example, while such norms will be expelled from
public places, they will be given a protected place in the private
sphere.
Even among those first order norms which should be granted
full reintegration into the comprehensive pluralist polity, some will
fare better than others. This seems inevitable since the second or
der norms operating alone cannot determine the configuration of a
pluralist society's legal and political institutions. Since all fully ad
mitted first order norms are not likely to coalesce into a harmoni-
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ous whole, institutional norms and practices are bound to rely
more heavily on some than on others.
In sum, comprehensive pluralism is a dynamic system that de
pends on the concurrent work of a thrust and counterthrust which
is propelled by the permanent tension generated by the friction be
tween its negative and positive work. In such a setting, proceduralism has an important negative role to play—it can be vital in
plurahsm's struggle against the permanent entrenchment of any
particular set of first order norms that it encompasses. However,
proceduralism can also play a limited, but nonetheless crucial, role
on the positive front. By exposing particular inequities through its
leveling mechanisms and by revealing concealed inequities through
the reversal of perspectives (in the case of Habermas's dialogical
proceduralism), proceduralism can channel pluralism's need for
contested first order norms toward more encompassing, widely
shared, and less oppressive alternatives. Although this would not
solve the problem of reconciling legal and factual equality, it might
significantly alleviate existing inequities.
To be sure, this seems to be a far cry from what Habermas
seems to expect from his proceduralist paradigm of law. All the
same, while Habermas may not have reconciled democracy, rights,
and justice through proceduralism, he has certainly shown us crea
tive and fruitful new ways to approach these elusive subjects, and
has afforded us new means to sharpen our grasp of them.

